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CURRENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LA--CoNSTRUCTION-INITIATIVE AND REFERENDU.-The
petitioner was nominated by a state senatorial district as delegate to a state con-
stitutional convention. The state constitution provided for the re-districting of
the state by the General Assembly, or, on its failure to act, by the Governor, the
Secretary of State, and the Attorney-General. Mo. Const. art 4, sec. 7. Subse-
quent to the petitioner's nomination, the State was re-districted by the executive
officers, and thereafter the Secretary of State refused to file the petitioner's
nomination. Held, (three judges dissenting) that the constitutional provision for
re-districting the State by the executive officers was repealed by the Initiative and
Referendum Amendment (Mo. Const. art. 4, sec. 57), and that the petitioner could
compel by mandamus the filing of his nomination. State, ex rel. Lashly, v.
Becker, Secretary of State (1921, MO.) 235 S. W. 1017.
In holding that the initiative and referendum placed all grants of legislative
power in a single forum, and thereby repealed the grant to the executive depart-
ment, the majority opinion seems to violate some of the basic canons of constitu-
tional construction. All parts of a law should be read together and harmonized
if possible. Wheeler v. Herbert (i9o7) 152 Calif. 224, 92 Pac. 353. To effect an
amendment of an existing constitutional provision the language must be clear and
unmistakable, the presumption being against a repeal by implication. People, ex
rel. Murphy, v. Field (i919) 66 Colo. 367, x8i Pac. 526. When a constitutional
provision will bear two constructions, one of which is consistent with, and the
other inconsistent with, an intention clearly expressed in a previous section, the
former should be adopted, so that both provisions may stand. Chance v. Marion
County (1872) 64 Ill. 66.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--ExERCISE OF POLICE POWER FOR PURELY AESTHETIc
PumRosEs.--In a mandamus proceeding the plaintiff sought to compel the Com-
missioner of Buildings to issue a building permit for store houses. The defend-
ant pleaded an ordinance which prohibited the construction of any business house
in a zone having more residences than business houses within a radius of 300 ft.
unless three-fourths of the owners of such dwellings agreed to the erection and
the building inspector approved of the design of the proposed structure. Held,
that the ordinance was unconstitutional and that mandamus should issue. Spann
v. City of Dallas (1921, Tex.) 235 S. W. 513.
Purely aesthetic purposes have not been considered a sufficient basis for an
exercise of the police power. See COMMENTS (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 171.
While the distressing effects of obnoxious odors and annoying noises are recog-
nized by the courts as injurious to public health, the significance of the reaction
of ugly surroundings upon the nervous system apparently is not appreciated in
the realm of law. See NOTES (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 419. With the develop-
ment of modern community interest, as manifested by desires for "civic centers,"
"zoning" ordinances, etc., it is to be hoped that the courts may recognize that
attempts to effect such a public purpose are certainly for the public welfare.
The European example is worthy of emulation even if state constitutional
amendment is necessary.
CRIMNiAL LAw-BURGLARY-BREAKING BY ONE HAVING AUTHORITY TO ENTER.-
The defendant was an intimate associate and friend of the owner of a dwelling-
house. Her privilege of entering the house was altogether free and unlimited.
She entered the house and stole a certain sum of money. In the trial court she
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was convicted and adjudged guilty of burglary. Held, that one who is privileged
to enter premises cannot be guilty of breaking into them, and so may not be
convicted of burglary. Davis v. Commonwealth (1922, Va.) n1o S. E. 356.
When, by the use of force, however slight-e. g. the turning of a key-one
enters a house at a time in the night when he is authorized to enter, and in an
outward manner which is authorized, but with an intent to steal, there is conflict
in authority as to whether he is guilty of breaking into the house, and conse-
quently whether he is guilty of burglary. The books sometimes make a nice,
but unjust, distinction, that though it is burglary if a servant enter with intent
to steal, at a tine and in a manner authorized, yet if a joint occupier enters with
like intent it is not burglary. See L. R. A. 1915 D, 1OI5, note; 9 C. J. io16. In
at least one case where the culprit was both servant and joint occupier, his state
of servanthood weighed more in the balance against him than his joint occupancy
for him. State v. Howard (19o2) 64 S. C. 344, 42 S. E. 173; contra, 2 Bishop,
Criminal Law (8th ed. 1892) sec. 97, note 12. The instant case apparently extends
the immunities of a joint occupier to an intimate family friend.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT-No ASSUMPTION OF RISK OF INJURY FROM UN-
FORESEEABLE NEGLIGENCE OF FELLow SERVANT.-While assisting in the movement
of an interstate train in the yards of the defendant railway company, the plaintiff's
intestate was killed through the negligence of a fellow servant. The plaintiff
sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act Act of April 22, 19o8 (35 stat
at L. 65Y. The lower court held that the deceased had assumed the risk of injury
from such negligence and that the defendant was not liable. The plaintiff appealed.
Held, that the ruling was erroneous, since under the federal act an employee does
not assume the risk of unforeseeable negligence of a fellow servant. Reed v.
Director-General of Rys. (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 191.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act abrogated the common-law fellow-servant
doctrine. Illinois Cent. Ry. v .Skaggs (1916) 240 U. S. 66, 36 Sup. Ct 249; Boyd,
Workmen's Compensation Acts (1916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 556. Although
the earlier decisions of some federal and state courts held that under the federal
act an employee never assumed the risk of injury from the negligence of a co-
employee, the more recent cases have applied the rule of the instant case. See
Chicago. R. I. & P. Ry. v. Ward (1920) 252 U. S. 18, 40 Sup. Ct 275; Ewig v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. (1918) 167 Wis. 597, 167 N. W. 442; 1 Roberts,
Federal Liabilities of Carriers (1918) sec. 56o.
EviDENCE-ADmISsiB]LITY OF PRICE OF ADJACENT LAND IN EMINENT DOMAIN
PROCEEDINGS.-In an eminent domain proceeding, the defendant was allowed to
introduce evidence of the sales of other land of similar character in the vicinity
for the purpose of showing the value of his own land. Held, that the evidence
was admissible. Virginian Power Co. v. Brotherton (1922, W. Va.) 11o S. E. 546.
Practically all jurisdictions admit evidence of this nature in the discretion of
the court when from the similarity of circumstances it is relevant and the tendency
to raise collateral issues is not too great Forest Preserve Dist. v. Kean (1921)
298 Ill. 37, 131 N. E. 117; Lewisburg Ry. v. Hinds (1916) 134 Tenn. 293, 183
S. W. 985; 1 Wigmore, Evidence (19o4) sec. 463. Such evidence is not admissible
in Pennsylvania and New York. Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia (1920) 268 Pa.
559, 112 AtI. 76; Robinson v. New York Elevated Ry. (1903) 175 N. Y. 219, 67
N. E. 431 (discussing New York's peculiar rule) ; see also State v. Wright (1921)
105 Neb. 617, 181 N. W. 539. Where the other sales were not voluntary as under
prior condemnation 'proceedings, 'such evidence is uniformly rejected. State v.
Wright, supra; Bonaparte v. City of Baltimore (1917) 131 Md. 8o, 10I Atl. 594.
Likewise evidence of previous offers to sell is regularly rejected because of its
slight probative value. Sharp v. United States (19o3) 191 U. S. 341, 24 Sup.
Ct 114. See (1915) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 83.
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INSURANCE-CLAUSE AGAINST SANE OR INSANE SuICiDE-RECOVERY BY BENE-
PICIARY WHERE INSURED WAS TOO INSANE TO REALIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF
His Ac.-An insurance policy contained a clause exempting the insurance com-
pany from liability for death by sane or insane suicide. The insured committed
suicide while so insane that he did not know he was taking his life. Held, that
the beneficiary could recover. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Wood (1921, Ky.)
236 S. W. 562.
The generally accepted rule is that a clause exempting the insurer from liability
in case the insured dies by suicide, either sane or insane, is a valid limitation of
the liability of the insurer and renders the policy voidable if the insured takes his
own life. 7 Ann. Cas. 659, note. The majority of courts apply this rule regard-
less of the degree or character of the insanity. De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker Life.
Ins. Co. (1875) 65 N. Y. 232; Clarke v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (19o2,
C. C. A. 4 th) 118 Fed. 374.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-REVENUE PENALTY.FOR FAILURE TO DECLARE-A reve-
nue statute imposed a penalty to the value of the merchandise imported on any
"goods, wares, or chattels" not declared in the manifest. Act of March 2, 1799
(I Stat. at L. 646). The defendant brought in some intoxicating liquors in his
ship, and failed to declare it in his manifest. Held, that he was not liable for the
penalty, since liquor is no longer "merchandise" in a legal sense. United States v.
Hana (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 276 Fed. 817.
This section was originally designed to prevent the fraudulent diminution of
the revenue income of the government from property Which is the lawful subject
of import and export. See United States v. Sischo (1921, C. C. A. 9th) 27o Fed.
958, 960. The court very properly effectuated this purpose by its interpretation
in the instant case. In so doing it also very logically refused to permit the
government to treat intoxicating liquor as property as against any "owner" or
dealer, who no longer himself has any property rights in the liquor as against
the government. COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 305, note 12.
Apparently the law is refusing to consider liquor as "property" for any purpose
except to punish crime,--and sometimes not even then. People v. Spencer (1921,
Calif. App.) 2O Pac. 130; (1921) 3, YALE LAW JOURNAL, 309.
LIMITATION OF ACTIoN-EFFECT OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION UPON EXISTING
RIGHTS OF ACTION.-The legislature of Louisiana enacted a statute which provided
that any action to annul a land patent must be brought within six years of the
issuance of such patent, or within six years from the date of the act. La. Gen.
Sts. 1912, ch. 62. The plaintiff sued after the six-year period had elapsed, claiming
that the statute could have no effect upon an existing right. Held, that the statute
was valid. Atchafalaya Land Co. Ltd. v. Williams Cypress Co. Ltd. (March 13,
1922) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1921, No. 1O6.
It is well settled that a statute of limitations applies to rights of action at the
time it is passed. The situation is the same whether the statute creates a limitation
where none existed before, or whether it changeg one already established. Terry
v. Anderson (1877) 95 U. S. 628. A reasonable period must be allowed, however,
for the prosecution of existing causes of action. 21 L. R. A. (N. s.) 157, note.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY OF OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE FOR SON'S NEGLI-
GENT DRIVING.-The defendant's son, the only licensed driver in the family, while
on business of his own, negligently drove his father's automobile against the
plaintiff's buggy, injuring the plaintiff's wife. The plaintiff sued the father. Held,
that the defendant was not liable as a matter of law. Whitelock v. Dennis (1921,
Md.) 116 Atl. 68.
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There is considerable conflict in the cases dealing with the question of whether
an owner of an automobile, kept for family use, is liable for the negligent driving
of the car by a member of the family. According to the familiar doctrine of the
"family automobile," the owner is liable for the negligent management and opera-
tion of the car by any member of the family for pleasure and convenience. The
rule may be based either upon the principle of respondeat superior or upon the
"dangerous instrumentality" doctrine. The first basis is of course fictitious, and
the second has been generally repudiated, though it was adopted in a recent Florida
decision. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson (192o, Fla." 86 So. 629. See
(1920) 5 MINN. L. REv. 322. As a general rule the owner should perhaps be
liable, but it seems more satisfactory to base his liability upon his having entrusted
a dangerous instrumentality to a negligent person than upon the fiction of master
and servant For a discussion, see (1920) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 467; (1917)
26 ibid. 327, 621; NOTES (192o) ig MI . L. REv. 543; NoTES (1915) 28 HARv.
L. REv. 9I; see also Baldwin v. Parsons (1922, Iowa) i86 N. W. 665.
PROXIMATE CAUSE-DA-MAGES RECOVERABLE FOR AGGRAVATION OF III.uRY.-The
plaintiff, whose leg was fractured as a result of the defendant's negligence, was
directed by his physician to use a crutch during the period of convalescence. The
crutch accidentally slipped, causing the plaintiff to fall and injure his leg again
at the same place. In an action for damages, the trial court admitted evidence of
the second fracture. Held, that the evidence was properly admitted. Wagner v.
Mittendorf (1922) 232 N. Y. 481.
The basis of the decision was that the second injury was a proximate consequence
of the defendant's negligence, since the plaintiff was obeying his doctor's instruc-
tions. Likewise, the negligence of a competent 'physician employed by the plaintiff
to treat his injuries does not constitute an intervening cause. Smith v. Kansas
City Ry. (1921, Mo. App.) 232 S. W. 261. It is well settled that a person who
has been injured as a result of another's negligence has no right to recover addi-
tional damages for an aggravation of the original injury unless he makes a
reasonable effort to prevent such an aggravation. Hartnett v. Tripp (1918) 231
Mass. 382, 121 N. E. 17; Hoseth v. Preston Mill Co. (19o8) 49 Wash. 682, 96
Pac. 423. See also (1921) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, i02. For the application of
the doctrine of proximate cause to workmen's compensation acts, where the
question is whether an aggravated injury arises "out of and in the course of" the
employment, see (192o) 6 VA. L. REG. 712; (1918) 3 MINN. L. REv. 123; see also
COMMENTS, supra p. 768.
TRAnE UNIONS-ANTI-TRuST LAwS-PICKTING TEATRE BECAUSE OWNER
OPERATES MACHINE HImsELF.-The plaintiff, owner of a motion picture theatre,
desired to reduce expenses by operating his motion picture machine himself.
The defendant union then published the theatre as "unfair" and placed a picket
in front of the theatre. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the picketing
and other acts of the defendant. Held, that the State Anti-Trust Act applied
and that an injunction should be granted. Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators (1922, Minn.) 186 N. W. 781.
Had the case been decided on common-law principles, the court would doubt-
less have followed its previous decision. Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators' Union (1918) 14o Minn. 481, 168 N. W. 766. On the same facts, an
injunction was granted. In the instant case, however, the court used a different
means of reaching the same result. The court held that the Sherman Act and the
State Anti-Trust Act were virtually the same and then accepted the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act. Duplex Printing Co.
v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct 172; Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 42
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Sup. Ct. 124; see also COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 408. Since
most of the state anti-trust acts are modelled after the Sherman Act, it will be
important to know whether the state courts will accept this interpretation of
state statutes. See also COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 643.
TRESPASs-TREES SEVERED FROM FREEHOLD-NO RECOVERY AGAINST DEFENDANT
IN ACTUAL ADVERSE POSSESSION.-In an action of trespass for cutting timber on
a certain freehold, it appeared that the plaintiff claimed the premises under a
land warrant, but that the defendant was in actual possession under bona fide claim
of title adverse to that of th e plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover.
Kossell v. Rhoades (1922, Pa.) 116 Atl. 56.
The constructive possession consequent upon holding paper title is a proper
basis for an action of trespass. First Nat. Bank v. Tome (1917) 23 N. M. 255,
167 Pac. 733. But an action to recover damages for injury to the freehold or
for severance and conversion of a portion of the freehold cannot be maintained
by the "true owner" against one in possession, claiming title adversely. The
appropriate method for trying title is by a suit in ejectment. Johnson v. Sand &
Gravel Co. (1897, C. C. A. 7th) 86 Fed. 269. After the issue of title is thus
determined, the owner is generally allowed to recover .for things severed from the
freehold, fructus industriales excepted. Stockwell v. Phelps (1866) 34 N. Y. 363;
contra, Powell v. Smith (1833, Pa.) 2 Watts, 126. Although the courts usually
decline to allow an action of trespass on the ground that title to realty can not be
tried in a transitory action, the real reason appears to be historical. Until the
real owner proved his superior title, the person in possession under claim of title
was deemed owner. The rule may be also justified on practical grounds; it,
prevents a multiplicity of suits. See L. R. A. 1918 A, 550 556, note; (1921) 5
MINN. L. REV. 155; COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 539.
TRUSTS-MASSACHUSETTS BUSINESS TRUST NOT "AssoCIATION" UNDER REVE-
NUE AcTs.-The plaintiff, a Massaehusetts trust, sued to recover a tax paid under
the Act of September 8, 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 789) providing for payment of a tax
by "every corporation, joint-stock company, or association . . . . having a
capital stock represented by shares," and the Act of February 24, 1919 (4o Stat
at L. 1126) providing for a special excise tax in lieu of the tax imposed by the
Act of 1916. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Hecht v. Malley (1921,
D. Mass.) 276 Fed. 830.
In spite of the fact that the Act of 1916, unlike the other acts which have been
construed in connection with this question, contains a comma between "joint-
stock company" and "or association," the instant case affirms the previous decisions.
Eliot v. Freenuzn (1911) 220 U. S. 178, 31 Sup. Ct 36o; Crocker v. Malley (1919)
249 U. S. 223, 39 Sup. Ct 27o. The court reasoned that since the other kinds of
organizations mentioned in the act are characterized by powers derived from
statutes, "association" was also intended to bring under the tax only such groups
as invoked special statutory powers-in their organization. This is not true of a
Massachusetts trust For a discussion of this problem, see COMMENTS (1918) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 677; (Ig9g) 28 ibid. 69o.
